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Abstract in English 
Flexible retirement - that is, the opportunity to choose one’s own personal retirement age - 
serves as a hedge against pension risk and provides insurance to workers facing health or 
productivity shocks. Flexible retirement and flexible pension schemes are in practice closely 
linked because of imperfect capital markets and institutional restrictions. This paper discusses 
three conditions to provide insurance through flexible retirement. First, it should be possible to 
adjust the pension starting date at limited cost. This condition is gradually being fulfilled, as 
many countries are moving towards more actuarially neutral pension schemes. Second, 
individuals should be willing to adjust their labour supply in case of a wealth shock. This 
condition seems largely fulfilled, although the available empirical evidence suggests that the 
framing of pension wealth is at least as important as the income effect. Third, the labour market 
should be able to deal with flexible individual retirement decisions. This condition is gaining 
importance, but has not yet received much attention in the literature. Institutions often hamper 
employment past the ‘standard retirement age’. Moreover, the hiring rates of older workers are 
low and their unemployment duration is high. Institutional reforms facilitating flexible 
retirement opportunities are desirable from an insurance perspective.  
 
Key words: retirement, insurance, labour market for older workers 
 
JEL code: J26, H55 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Flexibele uittreding - de mogelijkheid om individueel de datum te kiezen waarop men stopt met 
werken - helpt om het pensioenrisico en risico’s met betrekking tot gezondheid en productiviteit 
op te vangen. Flexibele uittreding is in de praktijk nauw verbonden met een flexibel 
pensioenschema. Dit komt door kapitaalmarktimperfecties en instituties die de opname van 
pensioen verbinden met de arbeidsaanbodbeslissing. In dit paper worden drie voorwaarden 
geformuleerd waardoor flexibele uittreding als een verzekering kan functioneren om de 
genoemde risico’s af te dekken. Ten eerste moet het voor de werknemer mogelijk zijn om de 
pensioenleeftijd aan te passen zonder dat dit veel kosten met zich meebrengt. De tendens 
richting actuarieel neutrale pensioenen heeft deze kosten weliswaar significant doen dalen, 
maar in Nederland en in andere landen is nog altijd sprake van ‘aanpassingskosten’. Ten tweede 
moeten werknemers bereid zijn om hun arbeidsaanbod aan te passen als sprake is van een 
vermogensschok. Dit blijkt het geval te zijn, al suggereert de literatuur dat men nog meer 
reageert op de vormgeving van de pensioenschok - bijvoorbeeld in termen van 
‘standaardpensioenleeftijd’ - dan op de financiële prikkel (het inkomenseffect). Ten derde moet  
  4 
de arbeidsmarkt voor ouderen het mogelijk maken dat men zijn uittredingsleeftijd aanpast. Deze 
voorwaarde wordt weliswaar steeds belangrijker, maar heeft nog niet veel aandacht gekregen in 
de literatuur. Fiscale en sociale zekerheidsinstituties kunnen het langer doorwerken 
ontmoedigen. De werkloosheidsduur van ouderen is lang en oudere werkzoekenden vinden 
moeilijk een baan. Institutionele hervormingen die flexibele uittreding beter mogelijk maken 
leiden tot verzekeringswinst. 
 
Steekwoorden: pensionering, verzekering, arbeidsmarkt voor ouderen Flexible Retirement 





Flexible retirement – that is the opportunity to choose one‟s own personal retirement 
age – serves as a hedge against pension risk and provides insurance to workers facing 
health or productivity shocks. Flexible retirement and flexible pension schemes are in 
practice closely linked because of imperfect capital markets and institutional restric-
tions. This paper discusses three conditions to provide insurance through flexible re-
tirement. First, it should be possible to adjust the pension starting date at limited cost. 
This condition is gradually being fulfilled, as many countries are moving towards more 
actuarially neutral pension schemes. Second, individuals should be willing to  adjust 
their labour supply in case of a wealth shock. This condition seems largely fulfilled, 
although the available empirical evidence suggests that the framing of pension wealth is 
at least as important as the income effect. Third, the labour market should be able to 
deal with flexible individual retirement decisions. This condition is gaining importance, 
but has not yet received much attention in the literature. Institutions often hamper em-
ployment past the „standard retirement age‟. Moreover, the hiring rates of older workers 
are low and their unemployment duration is high. Institutional reforms facilitating flexi-
ble retirement opportunities are desirable from an insurance perspective. 
 
Keywords: retirement, insurance, labour market for older workers 
 
JEL Codes: J26, H55 
 1. Introduction
1 
Flexible retirement means that the individual worker is able to adjust his working-life 
according to his own preferences and circumstances. Such adjustment may take place at 
the intensive margin (hours worked) or at the extensive margin ((non-)withdrawal from 
the labour market). Flexible retirement opportunities are gaining importance. The (im-
plicit) insurance provided to individual workers through flexible retirement opportuni-
ties has become more relevant now that many western countries have reformed their 
official and unofficial early retirement schemes. In the Netherlands, the disability insur-
ance scheme has long served as an unofficial early retirement route, but this scheme was 
gradually closed off for early retirees without serious disabilities (Euwals et al., 2011). 
Consequently, more individuals may now fall back on a flexible retirement scheme in-
stead of applying for disability benefits. In addition to the insurance aspect, the oppor-
tunity of adjusting one‟s working-life serves as a hedge against pension risk. In particu-
lar, two of the three macro-economic risks mentioned in Bovenberg and van Ewijk 
(2011) – viz. returns on non-human assets and demographic and health risks – can be 
hedged by the individual‟s labour supply. The ageing society increases the importance 
of these two risks as they are largely borne by an increasingly smaller share of the popu-
lation, and the hedging function of flexible retirement is therefore gaining importance as 
well. An important consequence of flexible retirement opportunities is that it allows for 
more risk taking in pension assets (Bodie et al., 1992; Choi and Shim, 2006; Farhi and 
Panageas, 2007; Choi et al., 2008). Within the Dutch institutional context this would 
imply that pension premiums could be lowered and/or expected pension benefits could 
go up. 
  Flexible retirement may properly function as a hedge against pension risk if the 
following conditions are met: (i) it is possible to either defer or advance the starting date 
of pension benefits at limited cost (both for the individual and pension fund or govern-
ment); (ii) employees are willing to adjust their labour supply in case they are con-
                                                 
1 I thank Lans Bovenberg, Casper van Ewijk, Mauro Mastrogiacomo, Pierre Pestieau, and Ed 
Westerhout for discussions and useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
 fronted with a change in their pension wealth; and (iii) the labour market makes it pos-
sible to adjust one‟s retirement decision. These three conditions are discussed in detail 
in this paper. The first and second condition refer to the supply side of the labour market 
for elderly, and have been studied quite extensively in the literature. For instance, Gru-
ber and Wise (2004) discuss labour supply effects of implicit taxes resulting from pen-
sion and early retirement schemes. The demand side of the labour market for elderly has 
been studied to a much lesser extent. Studies such as Daveri and Maliranta (2006), 
Daniel and Heywood (2007), Heywood and Siebert (2009), and Heywood et al. (2010) 
have nevertheless tried to explain the labour market outcomes of elderly. Policy has also 
largely focused on the first and second condition, in particular the role of financial in-
centives  in  retirement  decisions.  In  this  paper,  it  is  argued  that  the  third  condition, 
namely a proper functioning of the labour market for elderly, is also an essential ingre-
dient for the facilitation of flexible retirement. Older workers who are willing to adjust 
their retirement decisions should also be able to do so. Labour market reform – e.g. of 
employment protection and other institutional barriers to employment at higher age – 
seems key. To the extent that labour market reform increases the opportunities for flexi-
ble retirement, it strengthens the pension system and provides more income security to 
households. 
  In section 2 the link between flexible retirement and flexible pension schemes is 
discussed, together with some recent trends in flexible retirement. Section 3 discusses 
the effect of implicit taxes and subsidies which are typically the result of flexible pen-
sion schemes. Section 4 discusses the effect of pensions on labour supply, in particular 
the effect of a wealth change and the framing of pension wealth into „standard retire-
ment ages‟. In section 5 I discuss some typical characteristics of the labour market for 
elderly which may in practice hamper adjustments in the individual‟s retirement deci-
sion. In section 6 I discuss two recent practical cases for the Netherlands: reforms in 
second-pillar pension schemes and their effects on the labour market for elderly, and 
raising the statutory pension age and making first-pillar pensions flexible. Section 7  
concludes. 
 2. Flexible retirement and flexible pension schemes 
2.1 Definition 
An individual has basically two options on how to react to a negative wealth shock. 
First, he may decrease his life-time consumption. As the consumption adjustment will 
be similar in most periods, this option implies that some private savings must be re-
served to cover up a part of the income loss in the period of retirement. Second, he may 
increase his labour supply. The labour supply increase will then often be concentrated at 
the end of the individual‟s career (French and Jones, 2011). In practice, individuals will 
most likely apply a combination of these options, and raise their old-age labour supply 
to a certain extent. A discussion of the empirical estimates will follow in section 4.1. 
Pestieau and Possen (2009) assess the importance of flexible retirement opportunities 
after a wealth shock in the context of an overlapping generations growth model. They 
conclude that in the absence of flexible retirement, individuals would have to save con-
siderably more in order to insure themselves against a wealth shock. Allowing individu-
als to make their retirement decision dependent on their future state implies that they do 
not have to save as much, and are capable of avoiding abrupt changes in their life-time 
consumption. Flexible retirement opportunities thus serve as  a hedge against wealth 
shocks, including pension wealth shocks. 
    Increasing one‟s labour supply at old age may be facilitated by a flexible pension 
scheme. Flexible pensions are defined as pensions with a variable starting date. The 
individual is free to choose the starting date of his pension income. This starting date is 
not necessarily equal to the retirement date, i.e. the date at which one leaves to labour 
market. The coincidence of pension take-up and retirement depends amongst others on 
the restrictions imposed by the pension fund or public pension law (see section 5.4). 
The option to take up pension income at an earlier or later age is valuable for many in-
dividuals. If capital markets would be well-functioning, then there seems little reason 
for flexible pension schemes. In that case the age of take-up would not matter, as it 
would be possible to either annuitize revenues – in the case of postponing retirement – 
or borrow against future pension income – in the case of earlier retirement. It is how-
ever well-known that capital markets are imperfect. Most annuities offer notoriously poor returns (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988; Mitchell et al., 1999), and borrowing 
against pension income is often problematic.  
    Apart from providing insurance against a loss in pension wealth (e.g. as the re-
sult of poor stock market returns), flexible pension schemes may as well provide insur-
ance against personal risks. Flexible pension schemes may facilitate adjustments in re-
tirement choices in response to changes in personal circumstances, such as divorce or 
the death of a spouse.
2 Personal risks can be hedged by the option of increasing one‟s 
labour supply at old age. On the other hand, the possibility of early retirement may pro-
vide insurance to the individual facing a loss in earnings capacity. This last case is well 
studied in the literature. It is difficult to provide regular disability insurance for potential 
retirees, as it is virtually impossible for the insurer to determine who is really disabled 
and who is not (Diamond, 1977). The government (or pension fund) can therefore raise 
total welfare by introducing a flexible pension scheme, which provides insurance to 
workers  who  become  disabled  before  their  planned  retirement  date  (Diamond  and 
Mirrlees, 1978, 1986).
3 The authors demonstrate that the optimal pension scheme has 
increasing benefits with retirement age, but that the accrual is less than actuarially fair. 
This can either be achieved through the tax system or an implicit tax within the pension 
scheme. The extent to which the optimal scheme is actuarially unfair depends on the 
trade-off between the work disincentive induced by the implicit tax and the protection 
provided to disabled elderly. If work disincentives of implicit taxes are relatively strong, 
then there is no case for an actuarially non-neutral scheme. If, however, the asymmetric 
information problem of disabled elderly is relatively important, then there is a case for 
                                                 
2 Apart from hedging risks, a labour supply increase may be a matter of individual preference. 
For instance, it is known that leisure of partners in a household is complementary (Coile, 2004; 
Schirle, 2008), so that divorce or death of a spouse may increase the individual’s willingness to 
postpone retirement. 
3 Diamond and Mirrlees rule out the possibility of simultaneously receiving pension benefits 
and working in their model. In an alternative model, Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2008) 
relax this constraint to an ‘earnings test’. It is then allowed to take up pension benefits and 
work at the same time, but wages are taxed at a higher rate than before the pension take-up. 
If there were no earnings test, then everybody would take up their pension benefits early, and 
the system would become very costly. implicit  taxes  in  the  flexible  pension  scheme.  Cremer,  Lozachmeur,  and  Pestieau 
(2004a) also show that it is optimal to tax old-age labour supply, e.g. through the pen-
sion and social insurance system, in order to provide protection to workers with bad 
health and falling productivity rates.
4 The asymmetric information underlying the insur-
ance argument may be partly solved by holding audits in which the workers health 
status and/or productivity fall are assessed (Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Cremer, 
Lozachmeur, and Pestieau, 2004b). This can for instance be done by  a medical exam-
iner. In a system with audits, the pension (or social insurance benefit) provided to u n-
healthy/unproductive workers has a higher implicit tax than the pension provided to 
their healthy counterparts.  
 
2.2 Trends in flexible retirement 
We Individuals have different tastes for leisure, different earnings capacities, and differ-
ent wealth, and therefore different preferences for the age of retirement. An illustration 
of population heterogeneity in relation to retirement age is given in figure 2.1. The par-
ticipation rate of individuals with lower secondary education is about 10%-point lower 
than the average participation rate, whereas that of individuals with at least a bachelor 
degree  is  about  15%-point  higher.  Participation  rates  have  grown  for  all  education 
groups, but differences between groups are remarkably persistent. Many studies provide 
more formal evidence for heterogeneous retirement preferences. For instance, Hanel 
and Riphahn (2009) identify heterogeneous retirement preferences across birth cohorts, 
education, and sector of industry where the individual is employed. Schirle (2008) finds 
different retirement behaviour according to education level, labour force participation of 
the spouse, and the presence of children. 
 
                                                 
4 The authors do not distinguish between early retirement and social insurance schemes – such 
as Disability Insurance and Unemployment Insurance – but take the system as a whole. It is 
therefore difficult to compare their quantitative outcomes (simulation results) with the actual 
implicit taxes observed in many countries (see, e.g., Gruber and Wise, 2004). Figure 2.1 Labour force participation in the Netherlands for different education levels 
(source: Statistics Netherlands). 
 
 
Many countries acknowledge this heterogeneity in retirement preferences and therefore 
allow pension take-up at different ages. Such flexibility may go both ways: either earlier 
or later take-up than some „standard pension age‟. In the US, it was already possible 
since a long time to take up Social Security benefits before the statutory pension age. 
Once the US pension age is raised to 67, it will be possible to take up Social Security 
benefits at the age of 62 with a discount of 25% in the pension benefit level. The elimi-
nation of mandatory retirement in 1983 was an important step to allow retirement be-
yond the age of 65. In Switzerland, it has been made possible to take up state pension 
benefits before the statutory pension age at a discount of 6.8% per year. Pension take-up 
past the statutory pension age is also possible, with benefit adjustments between 5 and 
7.5% per year. Flexible pension take-up in Switzerland is also possible through occupa-
tional pension schemes, with similar benefit adjustments (OECD, 2009). In the Nether-
lands, flexible occupational pensions came up in the late 1990s and are now observed in 
most sectors of industry. The occupational pension schemes allow workers to retire be-
fore the statutory pension age of 65, usually at or around the age of 63. Apart from the US and Switzerland, the possibility of early take-up of first pillar pensions is also possi-
ble in Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Sweden (table 2.1). The minimum age is 
usually at or around 62, with a benefit reduction for each year of early take-up. Pension 
take-up of the first-pillar pension before the statutory pension age is not facilitated in 
the Netherlands and the UK. Some countries impose restrictions on the combination of 
paid work and receiving a pension before the statutory pension age – e.g. Austria and 
the US. In the US, it is allowed to receive Social Security benefits and work at the same 
time. But above a threshold earnings amount of about $37,000, Social Security benefits 
are partially withheld, and paid out later after full retirement. In Spain and Portugal, it is 
not allowed to have paid work while receiving a state pension. First-pillar pension take-
up after the statutory pension age is possible in all mentioned countries, except for the 
Netherlands. Most countries allow the combination of work and pension income after 
the statutory pension age. 
 
Table 2.1. Pension age in first-pillar pensions (source: OECD, 2009) 
  Statutory pension age  Early option  Later option  Earnings test 
Austria  65  62 (m)  68  with later pension take-up 
    57 → 60 (f)     
Finland  65  62  yes  - 
Germany  67  63  yes  - 
Netherlands  65  -    - 
Sweden  65  61  yes  with early pension take-up 
Switzerland  65  63 (m)  70  - 
    62 (f)     
UK  65 → 68 (m)  -  70  - 
  60 → 68 (f)       
US  66 → 67  62  70  with early pension take-up 
Note: A „→‟ indicates that the pension age will be raised in the future. In case the pension age differs between men and women, the different 
pension ages are indicated by „m‟ and „f‟. 
 
Flexible retirement can be achieved through gradual withdrawal from the labour market, 
either by reducing work hours within the same job (phased retirement) or change to a 
less demanding job with typically fewer hours and lower earnings (partial retirement). 
The transition process may combine wage income with a partial state pension and/or 
occupational pension during the period of gradual retirement. An example is the Swed-ish pension system, where workers above age 61 may reduce their working hours by as 
much as 50%, while receiving either 25, 50, 75, or 100% of their full pension benefits. 
According  to  Wadensjö  (2006),  the  Swedish  partial-pension  system  has  resulted  in 
higher participation rates of elderly. That is, the effect that people continue to work 
part-time instead of taking an early exit route is larger than the effect that people who 
would have continued to work full-time instead work part-time. The Swedish system is 
however an exception to the rule, as gradual transitions between work and full retire-
ment are still quite uncommon in most countries. A large majority of workers and em-
ployers in western societies still consider retirement a binary choice (Kantarci and van 
Soest, 2008; Heywood and Siebert, 2009). This is likely related to demand factors and 
institutions surrounding the retirement decision. For instance, employment protection is 
often high for older workers and suddenly falls to zero. And employers are often not 
keen on reducing work hours at the same hourly wage rate. These and other issues are 
discussed further in Bovenberg and van Ewijk (2011). 
  Both phased retirement and partial retirement typically involve a reduction of 
work hours, and thus more part-time work. The availability of part-time jobs could 
therefore be important for stimulating participation at old age. While it is true that some 
workers start to work less hours once it is possible to work part-time, findings in Wa-
densjö (2006) suggest that this effect is smaller than the effect of workers extending 
their  careers  in  part-time  jobs.  In  the  Netherlands,  part-time  jobs  are  exceptionally 
popular, and this is also reflected in jobs of the elderly. During the period 1992-2008, 
about two thirds of the participation growth prior to the statutory pension age was in 
part-time jobs, and virtually all participation growth after the statutory pension age was 
in part-time jobs (figure 2.2). It is likely that older workers in part-time jobs have a 
preference for flexible pension schemes, not only with variable take-up ages, but proba-
bly also with flexible drawings from their pension wealth to complement their wage 
income. 
 
 Figure  2.2.  Labour  force  participation  in  the  Netherlands,
a  according  to  gender  and 
hours worked (source: Statistics Netherlands) 
    
      
a The participation rate is defined as the number of individuals having paid work (for certain hours per week) divided by the total population 
in the concerning age category. Unemployed workers are thus not included in this definition of the participation rate. The category „1-11‟ 
means that at least 1 hour per week is worked, and at most 11 hours, etc. 
 
3. Implicit taxes and subsidies 
In theory, a flexible pension scheme can be designed such that it provides income to the 
retiree without affecting the price of leisure. In an actuarially neutral pension scheme, 
the delay of pension take-up leads to higher benefits in subsequent years such that total 
(expected) pension wealth remains unchanged. A drawback of an actuarially neutral 
scheme is that it provides only little insurance to workers with bad health or falling pro-
ductivity. Such insurance would require an implicit tax on the delay of pension take-up 
(section 2.1). On the other hand, some studies have indicated that the labour supply 
elasticity of elderly is relatively high, which would provide a rationale for an implicit 
subsidy for elderly according to Ramsey optimal tax considerations (Fenge et al., 2006; 
French and Jones, 2011). Third, an implicit subsidy on labour increases possibilities to 
hedge a shock in pension wealth against labour income. Until present, the economic literature has not provided a clear answer on which of these three arguments dominates 
the others, and therefore it remains uncertain whether departures from an actuarially 
neutral pension scheme are optimal. The vast majority of the economic literature has 
hitherto studied the detrimental welfare effects of high implicit taxes on labour supply, 
and policy has principally focused on bringing the price of leisure closer to its market 
value.  In  the  Netherlands,  this  was  done  by  stimulating  actuarially  neutral  pension 
schemes (section 6.1). This policy has in any case increased possibilities to use labour 
supply as a hedge against a pension wealth shock. 
  Although flexible pension schemes in western countries have typically moved 
towards actuarial neutrality, they mostly still tend to impact the price of leisure.
5 Pen-
sion schemes are often – either implicitly or explicitly – linked to the labour supply de-
cision of individuals, for instance through a work test, the fiscal system, or collective 
agreements between employers and employees putting restrictions on the combination 
of labour supply and occupational pensions (see section 5.4). Many pension and social 
security systems are still not actuarially neutral and lead to an implicit tax on continued 
work from a certain age. Empirical studies have shown that this has an important effect 
on the labour supply of elderly (Duval, 2003; Gruber and Wise, 2004). For the US it has 
been found that a change from a zero reward for continued work – that is, an implicit 
tax of 100% – to a postponement reward of one year-salary for a year of work leads to a 
postponement of retirement of about 10 months (Coile and Gruber, 2001; Asch et al., 
2005). Euwals et al. (2010) find that changing the reward to retirement postponement 
from zero to one year-salary leads to postponement of retirement by 6 months on aver-





                                                 
5 Note that the tax system may also impact the price of leisure, e.g. through age-dependent 
taxes. See section 5.4 for a brief discussion. Figure 3.1 Heterogeneous mortality rates: survival probabilities conditional on having 
reached the age of 65, for different education levels (source: Statistics Netherlands) 
 
Apart from a generic implicit tax, pension schemes may also generate implicit taxes for 
specific groups of individuals. Pension schemes impact the labour supply decision be-
cause they typically employ uniform parameters while there exists much heterogeneity 
among individuals. Even if a pension scheme is actuarially neutral at the aggregate level 
– say for the average individual – then the pension scheme may still cause large distor-
tions in the individual labour supply decisions. I discuss two cases: (i) the actuarial cor-
rection factor used in flexible pension schemes, and (ii) the uniform contribution and 
accrual rate. 
  The first type of implicit tax results from the uniformity in actuarial correction 
factors. Most pension funds make use of one discount factor and one mortality table 
based on (historical or expected) mortality rates for an average participant. First-pillar 
pension schemes with flexible take-up also typically use a uniform correction factor. 
Whenever pension take-up is related to the labour supply decision – and this is often the 
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Man, low Man, med Man, high Woman, low Woman, med/hightax on labour supply. The uniform actuarial correction factor contrasts with the hetero-
geneity in time preferences of potential retirees, which is well-known in the economic 
literature. Many studies have shown that there is a great deal of variation in both indi-
vidual discount factors and mortality rates. Estimates by Samwick (1998) and Gustman 
and Steinmeier (2005) show that only 40% of the population has a time preference rate 
below 5%, and that about one quarter to one third has an individual discount rate above 
15%. The heterogeneity in mortality rates is large as well. There is quite some interna-
tional evidence on the correlation between mortality rates and socio-economic charac-
teristics (Cutler et al., 2006; Hupfeld, 2009). An illustration for the Netherlands is given 
in figure 3.1. The median life expectancy at age 65 for low educated men is 79 years, 
whereas for medium and higher educated women it is more than 7 years higher. Kalwij 
et al. (2009b) estimate that the remaining life expectancy at age 65 for low income indi-
viduals in the Netherlands is about three years lower than for high income individuals. 
This implies that high income individuals receive a higher rate of return than low in-
come individuals when postponing their pension starting date. In general, a uniform 
correction factor for flexible pensions stimulates the expectedly long-lived to take up 
their pension at a later age, and the expectedly short-lived to take up pensions early. 
This form of adverse selection leads to a more expensive pension system. All individu-
als with life expectancy deviating from the average life expectancy can raise their total 
pension income by retiring either later or earlier. As far as pension take-up is related to 
retirement, the expectedly long-lived receive implicit subsidies when they delay retire-
ment, whereas the expectedly short-lived pay implicit taxes and are thus discouraged to 
supply labour at old-age. This way, women, non-migrants, wealthy, married, and well-
educated individuals receive implicit subsidies through the pension system when retir-
ing relatively late. These subsidies are paid by men, migrants, poor, unmarried, and 
less-educated individuals (Brown, 2003). On the other hand, the latter categories receive 
implicit subsidies by retiring early.  
 Figure 3.2 Implicit bonuses (+) and taxes (-) resulting from the uniform contribution 
rate to second pillar pensions in the Netherlands (source: Euwals et al., 2009; Bonenk-
amp, 2009) 
      
 
The second type of implicit taxes is related to the fact that defined benefit pension 
schemes are typically „backloaded‟. That is, pension accruals are lower than pension 
contributions early in life, and this is only compensated at the end of the worker‟s career 
(Ippolito, 1985; Disney and Whitehouse, 1996; Bonenkamp, 2009). Workers thus „in-
vest‟ in the pension plan early in life and re-earn their investment if they are also em-
ployed later in life.
6 In many countries, participants in a defined benefit pension scheme 
pay the same contribution rate to the pension scheme, whereas the accrual rate is also 
constant among individuals. The uniform contribution and accrual rates drive a wedge 
between the market value of the pension contract and the actual contributions  of the 
individual worker. Uniform contribution rates in second -pillar pensions are amongst 
others observed in Switzerland, the Netherlands and the UK. As an example, figure  3.2 
shows the amount of redistribution over the life-cycle for both male and female workers 
in the Netherlands, for different degrees of education. The amounts are expressed in 
percentages of wages. Older workers, women, and highly educated receive an implicit 
subsidy within the Dutch system. Younger workers, men, and lowly educated pay  im-
                                                 
6 If the degree of backloading differs between pension plans, then workers may face incentives 
during some points in their careers to either stay with the firm or leave for another firm. In 
case a pension plan has a relatively high backload, the employee has an incentive to stay with 
the same firm until retirement. In that case, the pension plan can be regarded as part of an 
‘implicit contract’ between the firm and the worker (Salop and Salop, 1976; also see section 
5.1). plicit taxes. Older women receive the largest implicit subsidies, whereas young men 
with low educational attainment pay the highest implicit taxes. The labour supply incen-
tive effects are thus particularly relevant for older women and young men. Higher edu-
cated men above age 50 receive an implicit subsidy on work through the pension sys-
tem. Medium educated men start receiving implicit subsidies in their late 50s, whereas 
lowly educated men do not receive any implicit subsidies over their entire life-cycle. All 
women above age 45 receive implicit subsidies on labour through the pension system. 
In conclusion, a large majority of older workers receives an implicit subsidy on contin-
ued work through the pension system. In other words, the marginal tax rate of older 
workers is lowered through the pension system whereas it is made higher for younger 
workers. 
 
4. Pension wealth and its framing 
Pension schemes affect labour supply in different ways. Apart from the substitution 
effects  described  in  the  previous  section,  pension  wealth  itself  and  its  framing  into 
„standard  pension  ages‟  impact  the  retirement  decisions  of  individuals.  This  section 
gives an overview of three different mechanisms. First, large pension wealth may stimu-
late individuals to retire early (section 4.1). Second, pension schemes may affect retire-
ment behaviour through socio- and psychological mechanisms (section 4.2). Finally, 
liquidity constrained and myopic individuals tend to retire whenever the opportunity 
exists, and early retirement opportunities in flexible pension schemes may therefore 
suppress labour supply (section 4.3). Apart from these three mechanisms, a malfunc-
tioning labour market – e.g. as a result of institutional constraints – may discourage 
workers to supply labour. That is, problems on the demand side may as well have con-
sequences on the supply side of the labour market. A discussion of the underlying de-
mand side problems is however left for the following section. As will be seen in this 
section, individuals are willing to adjust their labour supply after a wealth shock. This 
adjustment however appears to be modest, and perhaps even less important than the 
frames of the individual‟s pension. In particular, both the earliest possible pension age 
and the standard pension age have an important impact on the retirement decision. This should be taken into account  when using  labour supply as  a hedge against pension 
shocks. For instance, an unexpected decrease in pension wealth could justify higher 
early and standard pension ages. 
 
4.1 Income effect 
Pension wealth is meant to finance retirement. However, many empirical studies explor-
ing the impact of a marginal change in pension wealth on the retirement decision find 
modest effects. Krueger and Pischke (1992) find that a reform in the US state pension 
did not affect labour supply. Euwals et al. (2010) find a statistically significant but lim-
ited effect  of  (second-pillar) pension wealth on early retirement in  the Netherlands. 
They  find  that  a  wealth  increase  of  one  year-salary  on  average  implies  nearly  two 
months earlier retirement. Banks et al. (2007) find virtually the same effect for the UK. 
For working individuals above age 50, they find that a reduction of pension wealth of 
about one year-salary leads to a retirement postponement of about two months. French 
(2005) and Bloemen (2010) also find limited effects of pension wealth on labour sup-
ply. Bloemen‟s estimation results imply that a reduction in pension wealth by one year 
salary leads to later retirement by one month and a half. In a more general context – not 
specifically focused on retirement – Imbens et al. (2001) estimate that lottery winners 
consume just 11% of their winnings on leisure, which is in the same order of magnitude 
as the studies specifically focusing on pension wealth effects. Despite the relatively 
modest income effects found in the literature, it has been argued that many studies even 
overestimate the pension wealth effect on retirement (Van Ooijen et al., 2010). If indi-
viduals have at least some freedom of choice in their pension wealth, then a high prefer-
ence for retirement will go together with high pension wealth. This endogeneity prob-
lem is often not properly taken into account. 
  Several studies suggest that the impact of pension wealth on the retirement deci-
sion is stronger than the impact of other sources of wealth. This could be the result of a 
„labeling effect‟; see for example Thaler (1990). An impact of the wealth‟s label on re-
tirement appears irrational from the life-cycle point of view: wealth should be spent 
where it maximizes the individual‟s utility irrespective of the source of income. A ra-tional agent following the life-cycle model would typically smooth a wealth increase 
over his remaining life-cycle and allocate it to different goods, services and/or leisure. 
The empirical literature provides some indirect evidence on labelling effects in pension 
wealth.
7 Studies such as Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Samwick (1998) find only 
very little, if any, effect of private wealth on the timing of retirement. Moreover, hou s-
ing wealth is only of minor importance in the retirement decision (Skinner, 1996). Con-
fronted with the empirical literature on the pension wealth effect, these findings suggest 
that indeed pension wealth appears to have a stronger effect on retirement than private 
wealth. However, van Ooijen et al. (2010) contradict this stance, as they do not find 
convincing evidence that the private wealth effect  – excluding the housing wealth
8 – 
deviates from the pension wealth effect on retirement.  
  In sum, the empirical evidence largely confirms that individuals adjust their re-
tirement decisions to a change in their pension wealth. The literature suggests that this 
adjustment is larger than to a shock in private wealth, and in any case larger than to a 
shock in housing wealth. Most empirical studies concentrate at the extensive  labour 
supply margin, and find that retirement is postponed by about two months if pension 
wealth is decreased by one year salary. A possible explanation for the modest wealth 
effects found in the literature is that individuals were probably not able to adjust their 
labour supply, even if they were willing to do so. As will however be discussed in the 
following section, a change in pension wealth may have a larger effect if it is framed as 
a change in the statutory pension age. 
 
4.2 Social norms and default options 
Social norms and default retirement ages in pension schemes both lead to individuals 
focusing on particular institutionalized retirement ages more than on alternative retire-
ment ages. In most pension schemes one or two ages are the „standard‟ retirement ages, 
                                                 
7 There is no direct empirical evidence (yet) on a labeling effect of pension wealth. Some em-
pirical evidence does exist for other applications, such as child benefits (Kooreman, 2000). 
8 The authors find that the housing wealth effect on retirement is substantially smaller than 
the effects of other sources of private wealth. and many agents – in particular, workers, employers, and unions – appear to focus pre-
cisely on these ages. In the US, the ages of 62 and 65 were the standard choices. In the 
Netherlands, the early retirement eligibility age – usually around the age of 60 – was for 
a long time considered the „standard‟ retirement age. As will be discussed in section 6.1, 
the reform of early retirement arrangements has led to a higher „norm age‟ in the Neth-
erlands. In most sectors, the standard retirement age is now between 63 and 65 years. 
Although pension systems often contain financial incentives to retire at particular insti-
tutionalized ages, several studies have shown that a typical large unexplained retirement 
„spike‟ remains at these ages (Lumsdaine et al., 1996; Duflo and Saez; 2003). Mastro-
buoni (2009) has therefore taken a different empirical approach which leaves room for 
effects that are not directly related to financial incentives. Indeed, he finds larger effects 
of raising the „normal retirement age‟ in US Social Security than studies which focus on 
the effects of financial incentives. This empirical evidence suggests that social and psy-
chological issues play an important role in the tendency of workers to retire at a specific 
institutionalized age. Hanel and Riphahn (2009) achieve a comparable result based on a 
Swiss reform which entailed an increase in the normal retirement age in the (first-pillar) 
public pension scheme for women from 62 to 64 years. The empirical findings of Mas-
trobuoni (2009) and Hanel and Riphahn (2009) suggest that both social norms and de-
fault retirement options play a significant role in the retirement decisions of individuals. 
  Social norms affect consumption and labour supply behaviour, and are important 
for the welfare state. The utility of individual workers may incorporate disutility from 
norm deviation (Lindbeck et al., 1999). If the norm is to participate in the labour market 
as long as one is able to, then – apart from the utility derived from leisure – early re-
tirement would generate disutility to the individual worker. Such a norm would there-
fore stimulate the worker to postpone retirement. If a social norm is changed, this will 
lead to an adjustment in individual behaviour, and subsequently to a new equilibrium. 
For instance, if a social norm of early retirement at the age of 60 no longer applies, then 
this can have far-reaching consequences not only for participation rates of elderly, but 
also for their productivity and wages. There is no direct empirical evidence that social 
norms affect retirement behaviour, but the retirement spikes just mentioned together with Mastrobuoni‟s findings suggest that social norms do play a role in retirement be-
haviour. Moreover, in a recent survey Brown (2006) finds that many individuals tend to 
retire  at  the age which  they  consider the  “usual  retirement age”. About  half of the 
(American) individuals in his sample consider the ages 62 or 65 as the „usual‟ retire-
ment ages, one sixth considers another age as the „usual‟ retirement age, and the re-
maining third does not consider any retirement age to be „usual‟. It should be noted that 
social norms are not necessarily beneficial to society, and in fact they can be even harm-
ful. Akerlof (1980) refers to the „norm‟ that employers should not hire unemployed per-
sons at a lower wage rate than the current wage rate. Such a social norm leads to higher 
unemployment, which makes both unemployed persons and the employer worse off. It 
is well possible that a similar norm has played a role in the early retirement preferences 
of many European workers. Early retirement was for a long time considered something 
„good‟, not only for the large amounts of leisure received at a „low price‟, but also be-
cause it was believed by many that it would help to lower youth unemployment (Kalwij 
et al., 2009a). As this norm appears to be disappearing, the participation effects of rais-
ing the normal retirement age are probably much larger now than they would have been 
in the 1980s and 90s. 
  Psychological effects may play a role as well. Individuals often seem to choose 
the most „neutral‟ option from a choice set. In the literature, this is referred to as the 
tendency to choose a „default option‟, to focus at a „reference point‟, or „status quo bias‟ 
(see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1991). According to experimental studies, the tendency to 
choose a default option is positively related to the number of alternative options. This 
may  play  a  role  in  the  retirement  decision,  where  loss  averse  individuals  prefer  to 
choose the standard option rather than taking up their pension benefits earlier or later. In 
addition, financially illiterate workers may be unable to judge whether early or late 
take-up of pension benefits is beneficial to them, and therefore stick to the standard re-
tirement age. Default options have been studied mainly in the context of pension portfo-
lio rather than retirement age. In that context, there is overwhelming evidence that de-
fault options play an important role in the savings and pension portfolio decisions of individuals  and households  (see, e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988;  Thaler and 
Benartzi, 2004). 
 
4.3 Borrowing constraints and myopia 
As was discussed in section 4.2, many empirical studies find a „retirement spike‟ both at 
the earliest possible retirement age and at the „standard‟ retirement age. Apart from the 
sociological  and psychological  explanations  discussed in  that section, the retirement 
spike at the earliest possible retirement age may also be related to borrowing constraints 
and myopic behaviour. Some individuals are not able to retire before the pension eligi-
bility age, as they cannot access the funds necessary to finance this earlier exit. If capital 
markets would function properly and individuals were rational and forward-looking, 
then these individuals would be able to undo their forced savings in the mandatory pen-
sion scheme by borrowing against their future pension income. Likewise, the individu-
als could borrow against their first-pillar pension wealth. If, however, such borrowing is 
not possible, then these individuals are forced to work until they can access their pen-
sion rights, and therefore some clustering of retirement ages will occur at the earliest 
possible pension age. Rust and Phelan (1997) regard the retirement „spike‟ at the earli-
est possible retirement age in the US as indirect evidence for the relevance of borrowing 
constraints.  
  In addition, myopic individuals will tend to retire at the earliest possible age 
simply because they highly value their leisure in the near future. The retirement deci-
sions of both liquidity constrained and myopic individuals are thus relatively sensitive 
for the earliest possible age of pension take-up. That is, the participation of these groups 
may be importantly stimulated by raising this early pension age. 
 
5. The labour market for elderly 
Much of the literature on the labour market for elderly has focused on the supply side. 
This is understandable in light of the large labour supply disincentive effects of pension 
schemes that were prevalent for a long time (section 3). Recent studies have however 
argued that further reforms should focus on the demand side. The participation rate of elderly is now growing in most western societies as a result of better financial incen-
tives and better education. Meanwhile, the labour market for elderly does not seem to 
function well (for the Netherlands, see Euwals et al., 2009). This is reflected in low hir-
ing rates of older jobseekers, low job-to-job mobility, high unemployment duration, and 
negative perceptions by employers. In this section, I discuss both market forces and 
institutional factors which hamper the allocation of labour supplied by older workers. 
Deferred pay incentive schemes and specific capital are discussed in sections 5.1 and 
5.2, respectively, and some relevant institutional factors are discussed in sections 5.3 
and 5.4. In particular, the impact of employment protection on the labour market posi-
tion of older workers is discussed in section 5.3. 
 
5.1 Deferred pay incentive schemes 
Wage profiles and pension schemes can be designed such that they initially stimulate 
workers to stay with the firm, and after some time stimulate (early) retirement. This can 
be typically achieved by implicitly saving a part of the worker‟s compensation for a 
later  moment  in  her  career.  The  deferred  payment  –  which  may  for  instance  occur 
through high seniority wages or generous pensions – can be made conditional on the 
performance of the employee, so that it creates an incentive for the average worker to 
increase her productivity. These payment schemes have important implications for the 
labour market of older workers. Apart from the stimulation of early retirement by firms, 
an important consequence is that it may be unattractive for firms to hire older workers. 
  In a „bonding scheme‟ the worker is required to post a „performance bond‟ be-
fore work begins. Deferred pay at the end of the contract equals the bond itself. The 
incentive to perform is derived from the threat that the firm does not pay off the implicit 
bond to the worker (Becker and Stigler, 1974). Lazear (1979, 1981, 1983) proposed a 
payment scheme which connects the stylized model of Becker and Stigler with some 
empirical facts observed in the labour market. Instead of paying money to his employer, 
a worker in the Lazear model implicitly posts a performance bond in the early years of 
his career by accepting wages below his productivity level. The Lazear model is consis-
tent with the empirical findings that employers typically stimulate their older workers to retire, and that relative earnings increase in time although relative performance does not 
(Medoff and Abraham, 1980, 1981; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Dohmen, 2004). Wages 
thus typically show an increasing pattern during the worker's career, and the perform-
ance bond is paid out to the worker at the end of his career. The steepness of the pay-
ment scheme is closely linked to the probability that a shirking worker is caught. A low 
probability typically implies a steep wage profile (relative to the productivity profile), as 
workers can only be deterred from shirking by the threat of losing future payments 
(Lazear, 1979). The performance bond can for instance be paid out through a back-
loaded pension scheme (section 3) or higher wages at the end of the career.  
  As older workers become relatively expensive in such a payment scheme, the 
firm needs to get rid of these older workers in order to sustain the payment scheme. Ac-
cording to Lazear (2010), the mere fact that firms stimulate their older workers to retire 
can be considered “prima facie evidence that ... elderly workers are overpaid relative to 
their productivity”. Retirement can e.g. be stimulated through a pension plan containing 
disincentives to continue working (i.e. implicit taxes) or mandatory retirement. On the 
other hand, deferring pay generates an incentive for the firm to hire younger workers. 
Younger workers are relatively cheap and often bearing the costs of deferred payment 
of the firm‟s older cohorts of workers.
9 Deferred payment schemes are therefore typi-
cally associated with low hiring rates of older workers (Hutchens, 1986; Daniel and 
Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al., 2010).  
  Several empirical studies provide support for deferred pay incentive schemes 
(see, e.g., Lazear and Moore, 1984, Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004, for the US; Crepon 
et al., 2003 for France). Many of these studies are not able to directly prove the rele-
vance of the theory, but rather find results which are consistent with the theory. On the 
other hand, some studies – e.g. Hellerstein et al. (1999) – produce results which are not 
consistent with deferred pay incentive schemes.  
                                                 
9 This need not be the case if the deferred payment scheme is capital funded. However, it 
seems unlikely that for each worker, excess wages at the end of his career precisely corres-
pond to the posted implicit bond on an actuarially neutral basis.   Lazear style implicit contracts will perhaps become less important in the future 
The low hiring rates of older workers may rise as a result of autonomous forces. First, 
young workers seem nowadays less willing to post implicit bonds, because lifetime jobs 
have become quite uncommon. Labour mobility has increased for younger cohorts of 
workers, and the average lifetime of firms has decreased. It will therefore be more diffi-
cult for firms to offer implicit contracts to employees in the form of deferred payment 
schemes. Moreover, the ageing workforce would imply more redistribution from young 
workers to old workers and retirees in order to sustain deferred payment schemes. It is 
questionable whether young workers would be willing to pay „implicit taxes‟ in addition 
to their „implicit performance bonds‟. Third, older workers often stay with the firm for a 
longer period than before, which makes deferred payment schemes more expensive for 
the firm. It is now more difficult for firms to terminate contracts of older workers as a 
result of institutional reforms. Mandatory retirement was banned in the US in 1983, and 
in the Netherlands, participation rates of elderly have gone up as a result of the reforms 
of pathways into early retirement (pensions, disability insurance).  
 
5.2 Specific capital 
The demand for labour of older workers may be relatively low because hiring them in-
volves specific investments which are not easily recovered. The firm typically incurs 
some fixed costs per newly hired employee, which are the result of the hiring and selec-
tion procedure, and training of the newly hired worker. The tenure of older workers is 
typically limited as a result of an institutional pension age. Firms prefer to hire young 
workers given that the expected tenure of older workers is relatively short (Hairault et 
al., 2010). This argument is particularly important in a world with immobile workers. In 
that case, firms will only hire young workers and earn a maximum rent on the specific 
investments made. It was however argued in the preceding section that young workers 
are becoming more mobile in most western countries. As a result, young workers be-
come relatively less attractive, and the hiring rates of older workers may be increased. 
  It seems questionable whether specific capital plays a decisive role in the wages 
of older workers. An implication of specific capital theory is that workers are paid less than their value to the firm, as the firm and worker share the rents on specific invest-
ments. This seems less plausible for older workers. Many studies have shown that wage 
profiles are steeper over the life-cycle than productivity profiles (see the previous sec-
tion), which is at odds with specific capital theory. Moreover, many firms encourage 
their  older  employees  to  retire,  which  is  at  odds  with  the  firm  benefiting  from  the 
worker‟s specific capital. This is not to say that specific capital is irrelevant. The claim 
is that deferred payment schemes appear more relevant in explaining labour market out-




5.3 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
As was seen in section 5.1, deferred payment schemes may stimulate productivity over 
the worker‟s life-cycle. As long as redistribution takes place within the firm, such pay-
ment schemes are apparently in the interest of both the firm and the employee. Steep 
wage profiles can however be inefficient if they are driven by public institutions. Better 
employment protection of older workers implies a stronger bargaining position. It en-
ables them to bargain higher wages, in particular when older workers have a relatively 
large vote in trade unions. The resulting wage profiles cause distortions in the hiring and 
firing decisions of firms. Moreover, they contribute to the „golden chains‟ for older 
workers, making them less mobile, less willing to train and less motivated.  
  Firms are less likely to hire older workers if EPL is specifically protecting the 
rights of this group. Older employees are often better protected than younger employ-
ees, and are therefore on average more expensive. For instance, severance pay in the 
Netherlands depends on age (the so-called „ABC-rule‟). Newly hired workers build up 
severance pay rights twice as quickly if they are above age 50 when compared to work-
ers under age 40. This is usually justified on grounds that older workers have more 
firm-specific human capital, and that they are entitled to unemployment insurance for a 
                                                 
10 Some empirical studies find that specific capital is most relevant for young workers, whereas 
deferred payment schemes are most relevant for older workers (Seltzer and Merrett, 2000; 
Dustmann and Meghir, 2003; Shaw and Lazear, 2008). relatively long period (internalization of unemployment costs).  In  France, the lower 
firing tax for workers that were hired after age 50 has increased the relative hiring rates 
of these workers (Behagel et al., 2008). On the other hand, firing rates increased as well. 
Similarly, Kugler et al. (2003) conclude that the decrease in firing costs in Spain has 
increased both hiring and firing of older workers. 
The currently observed pattern of rising EPL up to the statutory pension age and then 
suddenly dropping to zero seems questionable. As a worker approaches retirement, the 
return period for firm-specific human capital falls, as does the remaining period over 
which the elderly worker can claim unemployment insurance. It suggests that employ-
ment protection should display a hump shape, falling to zero again as the worker ap-
proaches retirement. Chéron et al. (2008) find that a hump shaped firing tax profile is 
first best, on grounds that the distortionary effects are greater for older workers than for 
younger ones. In a world with labour market frictions, bargaining power and unem-
ployment  benefits,  the  authors  even  conclude  that  the  optimal  firing  tax  profile  is 
strictly decreasing with age. 
  Workers may lose their accumulated employment protection „rights‟ when they 
switch employer. This creates golden chains for (older) workers, reducing job-to-job 
mobility. An alternative is to make the accumulated severance pay portable. In 2003, 
Austria switched to a system of individual savings accounts for job loss. Employers pay 
contributions to this account. Employees can receive a payment from the account in 
case of dismissal, but can also carry over the account to a new job. At retirement the 
remaining funds go to the individual retirement account. This system breaks the golden 
chains. However, it also eliminates some insurance. 
 
5.4 Other institutional factors 
Restrictions on the combination of work and pension income are among the most im-
portant causes of employment differences in OECD-countries (Alonso Ortiz, 2009). In 
countries such as Portugal and Spain, people will only receive a state pension if they do 
not work. In France, it is obliged to take a 6-month break after the pension starting date. 
Until 2000, individuals drawing Social Security benefits in the US faced an earnings test implying benefit reduction above an income threshold level. In the UK, the earnings 
test was abolished in 1989. Contrary to many other countries, the Dutch state pension 
has never involved an earnings test. One is free to participate in the labour market while 
receiving a (full) state pension. Participants are however not entitled to social insurance 
for workers (disability and unemployment benefits), and have no employment protec-
tion. In fact, most workers who reach the state pension eligibility age in the Netherlands 
lose their employment protection. Note that an earnings test could make sense in the 
context of flexible pensions as an insurance device (see section 2). However, it obvi-
ously discourages labour supply. 
  Tax rules or collective agreements between social partners may also hamper the 
employment of elderly. Occupational pension schemes may limit possibilities to stay in 
the labour market. In the US, most employees cannot access their pension benefits while 
staying in the same job. The same holds for many employees in the Netherlands. De-
fined benefit pension schemes based on final pay discourage part-time work or partial 
retirement,  and  may  therefore  stimulate  early  retirement.  However,  most  pension 
schemes in the Netherlands have now switched from final pay to average pay, so that 
this kind of work disincentive has largely disappeared. On the other hand, the tax sys-
tem may encourage employment of elderly. In the Netherlands, older workers receive a 
„work bonus‟ through the tax system. The effective tax rate on labour supplied by older 
workers is therefore lower than for younger workers.  
  Older workers are often not able to reduce their working hours and prolong their 
stay in the labour market. Inflexibilities regarding hours of work may be caused by 
fixed employer costs or production technology (Hurd, 1996). Fixed costs may for in-
stance result from administrative duties and workplace costs. Restrictions in production 
technology may relate to indivisibilities of tasks and difficulties in job scheduling. Ac-
cording  to  a  survey  among  Western  European  personnel  executives,  “hidden  extra 
costs” was the mostly named (32%) obstacle for working hours reduction (Smolkin, 
1996). “Production problems” was named an obstacle by 30% of the respondents. Van 
Dalen et al. (2008) find that a majority of full-time employed older workers in the Neth-
erlands would prefer to reduce their working hours. 41% of the interviewed workers prefers a working-time reduction with 20%. The fact that these workers are full-time 
employed suggests that working hours constraints play a role. It is also remarkable to 
see most workers past the age of 65 work part-time, whereas a majority of workers who 
have not reached the public pension age works full-time (figure 2.2). Employees past 
the age of 65 face less institutional restrictions (e.g. EPL, social insurance). In the US, it 
is known that health insurance may hamper job changes of older workers, in particular 
if they have a chronic health problem (Hurd, 1996). Employers are more likely to per-
mit a reduction in working hours for the individual white-collar worker „who requires 
little supervision and makes an extra effort to get the job done‟ (Hutchens, 2010). 
 
6. Experience in the Netherlands 
In this section I highlight recent developments in the Netherlands on flexible pensions. 
The reform of early retirement schemes and their integration into the second-pillar pen-
sions was largely seen as a success, as it has removed high implicit taxes on labour sup-
ply (section 6.1). On the other hand, some doubts have arisen on the (more recently 
proposed) flexibilisation of first-pillar pensions, as this does not appear to add much to 
the Dutch institutional context (section 6.2). Remarkably, one of the core arguments in 
this paper – flexible pensions as a hedge against pension shocks – has hardly played a 
role in the Dutch pension debate. 
 
6.1 Flexible retirement in occupational pensions 
During the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, many sectors of industry in the Nether-
lands introduced pay-as-you-go early retirement schemes without actuarial adjustments 
for different retirement ages. After reaching a certain age, a worker could retire and re-
ceive gross benefits of about 80% of the last earned wage. The net replacement rate was 
even higher due to the progressive tax system and a continued accrual of old-age pen-
sion rights. The eligibility age varied over the sectors of industry from about age 58 to 
62. The implicit tax rate of continuing to work another year was more than 100% for 
most workers, implying a net subsidy on retirement rather than a reward for work (De 
Vos and Kapteyn, 2004). The resulting drop in the participation rate of elderly was ac-tually an explicit goal of these schemes in order to save jobs for the young. The early 
retirement schemes, however, became costly and some serious doubts arose about the 
saving of jobs for the young.
11 
  During the 1990s the Dutch unions and employer organizations agreed on trans-
forming the early retirement schemes into less generous actuarially fair schemes. The 
participants of the pension scheme for civil servants were the first to face the new early 
retirement conditions, from April 1997 onwards. In most sectors of industry it was d e-
cided to implement transitional arrangements. The transition was initially supposed to 
be completed in the year 2022, but was accelerated considerably in 2006. Since then, 
the Dutch early retirement scheme is integrated with the second -pillar pension system. 
The fiscal framework of occupational pensions allows for a building up of a pension 
benefit (flat-rate state pension benefit plus occupational pension) of a full 100% of the 
last or average earned wage at age 65. Workers are allowed to retire before age 65. The 
special fiscal treatment stays in place as long as the pension benefit is adjusted in an 
actuarially neutral way. Some of the largest Dutch pension funds allow for an early r e-
tirement benefit of about 70% of the average earned wage at age 63. In add ition, a life-
course arrangement – a fiscally subsidized savings arrangement to finance leave during 
the working-life – was introduced. It is however mainly used to finance early retire-
ment. Since January 2009, older workers receive an age-related tax credit on their wage 
income, which aims to stimulate their participation.  
  Within a time span of about ten years, the Netherlands has moved from a system 
with an implicit tax on continuing to work of about one hundred percent to a system 
with an implicit subsidy on continued work. The implicit subsidy through the tax sys-
tem ranges between 5 and 10% for ages 62-65, and the implicit bonus through the back-
loaded pension system ranges between 0 and 10% for these ages. It could be optimal to 
subsidize the labour supply of older workers in case they are more elastic than younger 
                                                 
11 Although most economists do not believe that early retirement leads to less youth unem-
ployment – a form of the so-called ‘lump of labour fallacy’ – many non-economists appear to 
have believed in it (Barr and Diamond, 2009). In a recent empirical study, Kalwij et al. (2009a) 
confirm that youth unemployment and early retirement are not negatively correlated. workers (section 3). The empirical evidence on the variation of labour supply elasticities 
with age is however very limited, and therefore it seems too early to reach a final con-
clusion on this argument (Weinzierl, 2008; Euwals et al., 2009). The „norm age‟ for 
retirement has importantly increased. In the 1990s and before, the early retirement eli-
gibility age was about 60, and nowadays the „standard‟ early retirement ages in the 
Netherlands are 63 or higher. The impact of both financial incentives and the norm ef-
fect on the participation rate is substantial. Euwals et al. (2009) estimate that improved 
financial incentives (in particular cutting implicit taxes) have led to an increase of the 
average retirement age by about two and a half years. 
 
6.2 Raising the statutory pension age 
The fiscal sustainability gap in many western economies is for an important part caused 
by a fixed pension age in combination with increased longevity (see, e.g., Cournède and 
Gonand, 2006; van Ewijk et al., 2006). Individuals spend a larger share of their lives in 
(pay-as-you-go financed) retirement and a smaller share doing paid work. Many west-
ern countries have therefore implemented legislation to raise the statutory pension age. 
In the US and Norway the pension age was raised to 67 years, with possibilities for 
flexible take-up between the ages of 62 and 70. The pension age is also being raised in 
Germany, Denmark, the UK, and other countries. Raising the statutory  pension age 
stands high on the political agenda in the Netherlands. If the statutory pension age is 
raised by two years, i.e. from 65 to 67, then total pension wealth decreases on average 
by one to one-and-a-half year-salary.
12 This includes lower savings in occupational pen-
sions, as the standard retirement age in occupational pensions is typically linked to the 
statutory pension age. According to estimates in Euwals et al. (2010), the income effect 
would then increase the average retirement age by two to three months. Socio- and psy-
chological effects would lead to a further increase in elderly participation rates (section 
4.2). 
                                                 
12 The average pension replacement rate in the Netherlands (both first and second pillar) is 
between 50 and 75%.   Much of the policy discussion in the Netherlands has focused on differentiation 
of the pension age between groups of workers. Although some groups favour flexibili-
sation of the first-pillar pension scheme, doubts have arisen on its benefits. Second-
pillar pensions already offer much retirement flexibility at the extensive margin, so that 
the benefits of a flexible pension age discussed in section 2.1 already apply for an im-
portant part. In addition, the intensive margin is relatively flexible in the Netherlands. 
Adjustment of hours worked is relatively easy in the country with the highest incidence 
of part-time work. Furthermore, flexibilisation lowers the socio- and psychological ef-
fects boosting participation rates. Both social norms and default options become less 
important, as the focus on the institutional retirement age(s) becomes less. Finally, the 
pension system will become more expensive as the expectedly short-lived will retire 
earlier than the expectedly long-lived (adverse selection). In the Netherlands, flexible 
retirement opportunities can be organized without a flexible first-pillar pension scheme. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Flexible retirement opportunities provide insurance to individual workers. Health and 
productivity risks can be covered by the opportunity to shorten one‟s working life. The 
risk of income loss as the result of divorce or death of a spouse can be covered by the 
opportunity to extend one‟s working life. Flexible retirement can also serve as a hedge 
against pension risk: a loss in pension wealth can be compensated by later retirement. 
Flexible retirement is in practice closely linked to a pension scheme with flexible start-
ing dates as a result of borrowing constraints, an imperfect annuity market, and institu-
tional restrictions. Insurance through flexible retirement works well if (i) it is possible to 
adjust the pension starting date at limited cost; (ii) the individual is willing to adjust his 
labour supply in response to a pension wealth shock, and (iii) labour market institutions 
and employer-employee relations facilitate later retirement. 
  The first condition seems largely fulfilled in most countries, as they have moved 
towards actuarially neutral pension schemes. The cost of adjusting the retirement age is 
then in principle zero for the average individual (and also for the pension fund or gov-
ernment). Population heterogeneity – for instance in longevity – and backloaded pen-sion schemes however still lead to distortions in the price of leisure, and thus generate 
implicit taxes and subsidies on retirement adjustments. In the Netherlands, the special 
fiscal treatments of older workers also impacts their labour supply. The current implicit 
subsidies on delayed retirement stimulate participation at higher age, but limit the insur-
ance against health and productivity risks provided by flexible pensions. 
  The second condition has been studied to a lesser extent. Most studies indicate 
that workers are willing to adjust their labour supply in case of an unforeseen change in 
pension wealth. Policy seems to have focused on the financial incentive (the income 
effect), whereas the framing of pension wealth appears at least as important. In particu-
lar, the earliest possible age of pension take-up and the standard pension age have im-
portant labour supply effects.  
  The third condition has not received much attention in the literature. In practice, 
it is not always possible to extend one‟s working-life. Institutions may hamper employ-
ment past the „standard retirement age‟, and employers are often not keen on hiring 
older workers. Job-to-job mobility is low and the unemployment duration of elderly is 
high. Both the institutional setting (e.g. employment protection legislation) and market 
forces (e.g. deferred payment schemes and specific capital) lead to problems on the la-
bour market for elderly. Firms often prefer to hire young workers, as the expected time 
horizon for materializing specific human capital investments is longer. This argument 
may however become less relevant if young workers become more mobile and the pen-
sion age is raised. Deferred payment schemes may also become less relevant in the fu-
ture. They become unsustainable if the high wages of elderly are to be financed by 
smaller cohorts of young workers. In most western countries, the institutional setting 
however still needs the attention of policy makers. The accommodation of individual 
retirement adjustments can be improved. 
  A well-functioning labour market improves possibilities for elderly to extend 
their working lives, and this way it becomes more likely that policy measures such as 
raising the statutory pension age are turned into a success. In the recent past, several 
measures were taken to increase the labour force participation of elderly. The implicit 
taxes on labour induced by pension schemes have been lowered in many countries, in-cluding the Netherlands. Another measure taken in many western countries, and still 
being under debate in other countries, is raising the statutory pension age. This mostly 
concerns the first-pillar pension age, but in some cases also the combination of first-
pillar and second-pillar statutory pension ages (e.g. in the Netherlands). With these kind 
of reforms, later retirement is more likely if all three conditions are satisfied. A potential 
drawback of a flexible pension scheme is that it cushions both the normative and the 
psychological effect of a higher pension age, mitigating the participation growth after 
increasing the pension age. A „retirement spike‟ at the earliest possible pension age may 
be the result of liquidity constrained workers or myopic behaviour. Raising the statutory 
pension age would therefore have more pronounced labour force participation effects if 
the minimum pension age is also raised. References  
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